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\VEBER BASIN WATER CONSEllYANCY DISTRICT and
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BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought to recover the fair market
Yalue of shooting privileges in the Ogden Duck Club
which were terminated as a result of the construction
of the \Villard Bay reservoir.
3
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the pre-trial hearing in the matter on the day
set for jury trial the court by minute entry order (R.
64) entered a "Judgment for non suite" in favor of
defendants, and thereafter-even though no jury trial
was had, as requested by plaintiffs-entered formal
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 65-69),
and a Judgment (R. 70) dismissing plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice, thereby terminating the proceeding before any evidence was submitted to a jury.
Judge Charles C. Crowley, one of the other judges
of the same district, had previously refused to dismiss
the very same complaint (R. 21) when defendants in a
prior hearing had made a formal Motion to Dismiss
(R. 11).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment dismissing
the action, and request that they be permitted to submit
the facts to a jury for determination of whether a cause
of action and damages has been established.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since plaintiffs sustained a dismissal of their complaint without being afforded the opportunity of presenting the facts to a jury, they are entitled under the
well-established rules of law to have this court consider
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the evidence which is now in the record, and which they
might reasonably otherwise contend would be established, in the light most favorable to themselves. The
facts hereinafter set forth will follow the rule laid down
by this court in the very recent case of Baur v. Pacific
l!'illrlllcc Corporation (Utah-July 2, 1963), 383 P. 2d
:m7, wherein this court stated-

"As we have heretofore declared, the granting
of a motion to dismiss, which deprives the party
of the privilege of presenting his evidence, is a
harsh measure which courts should grant only
when it clearly appears that taking the view
most favorable to the complaint and any facts
which might properly be proved thereunder, no
right to redress could be established; and unless
it so clearly appears, doubt should be resolved
in favor of allowing him the opportunity to pre:sent his proof."
In the year 1936 there lived in the farming community of Plain City, Weber County, a widow by the
name of Annie C. Maw. Mrs. Maw and her four sons
owned and operated well in excess of 1,000 acres of
farming and grazing land in the area north of Plain
City. being partly in Weber County and partly in Box
Elder County. The particular grazing lands extended
westerly into the marsh lands of the Great Salt Lake
where individuals from the city of Ogden had organized
a club for the purpose of shooting ducks. (See Pl. Exh.
E).
This group, knuwn as the Ogden Duck Club, one
of the defendants herein, recognized that in order to

5
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utilize lands which they had under lease from the State
of Utah for such purposes, it would be well to secure
from Mrs. Maw a written right-of-way so as to insure
continued passage in the future across her lands in going
to and from their clubhouse and duck hunting area.
No other route was available. Accordingly, the Ogden
Duck Club had its attorneys prepare a Right-of-Way
Agreement providing for such passage rights and other
matters. The agreement is set forth in its entirety on
page (1) of the Appendix of this brief. Further reference will be made to it later in this brief. See also R. 5, 6.
Being solicitous of the future of her four sons and
her grandsons, Mrs. Maw executed the .agreement
which, by its terms, provided that as part of the consideration for the right-of-way her sons would have the
privilege of using the duck club's "shooting grounds
... on days excepting the opening day, Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, ... ", and that the four designated
sons could '' . . . designate one son for each thereof to
shoot and enjoy the privileges hereunder in place of such
son's father; . . . "
Mrs. Maw apparently made a bargain which proved
to be very advantageous to her entire family. Not only
were the shooting rights and privileges enjoyed by her
family non-assessable in that they were not required
to pay the annual dues of the club, but it developed
that the members of the Maw family soon were in social
and business contact with the most elite professional and
business leaders of the Ogden area. As an example, the
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members of the duck club immediately prior to the
bringing of this action included such prominent individuals as A. E. Benning, Frank M. Browning, James
~I. De\' ine, (~eoi·ge S. Eccles, Spencer S. Eccles, W.
L. Eccles, Ito bert N ye, J. Fletcher Scowcroft, George
L. Abbott, Fred Froerer, Sr., Ed Greenwell, H. A.
Benning and a long list of similar well-known indivi<luals (R. 25). An equally prominent membership
existed in prior years. These contacts considerably influenced the lives and fortunes of the four Maw sons,
helping to provide them with credit, business and social
contacts and an open door to many contacts which they
would hardly have experienced as ordinary farm boys.
Their personal contacts with the bankers, doctors, business leaders and other members of the club, together
with the use of boats, clubhouse facilities, blinds, and
the experience of social activities involving parties, personal attendants, excellent food and other amenities of
the club, all contributed to making the memberships
exceedingly valuable.
In the course of time three of the brothers died,
leaving at the time when the complaint was filed one
brother, George C. Maw, surviving. ~owever, upon
the death of the other three brothers at least one, and in
some instances two, of their sons were substituted in
place of their respective fathers. These grandsons of
Annie C'. 1\Iaw similarly used the duck club facilities
and continued to shoot ducks and otherwise partake of
the club's facilities in place of their fathers.

7
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Althovgh the lower court took it upon itself in the
course of pre-trial proceedings to place a construction
of the agreement which would not permit the grandsons
to use the facilities, nevertheless all of the affected
parties hereto so construed the agreement as permitting
these grandsons to continue to use the facilities which
their fathers had previously enjoyed.
Along about 1956, or thereabouts, in the course of
progress, the Weber Basin District, one of the defendants, acting in conjunction with the United States
Bureau of Reclamation, concluded from its studies that
there should be built a water storage reservoir to be
known as the Willard Bay Reservoir. This particular
reservoir was planned to cover a substantial portion
of the Maw land holdings and a portion of the leased
grounds where the duck club had its clubhouse and part
of its shooting area. The Ogden Duck Club did not
own any fee ground (R. 46, 48). In the meantime,
Annie C. Maw had passed to her reward and her lands
were passed down to Grace B. Maw, a widow of one of
the sons, and W. John Maw and Sons, Inc., a corporation.
The Weber Basin District contacted the Ogden
Duck Club and arranged to physically move its clubhouse about % of a mile west from its previous location
so that it would not be inundated by the reservoir to be
created (R. 72- p. 33), and its representatives, lawyers
and associates contacted Grace B. Maw and W. John
Maw and Sons, Inc., for the purpose of acquiring
the necessary lands which the Maws owned in the reser-
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voir area (R. 7'2 - p. 47). And, as the plot for this liti-

gation began to develop, it became evident that the
t·onstruction of the reservoir would obliterate and cover
the road which the Ogden Duck Club had been using
through the Maw properties. With respect to this road,
the \V eber Basin District arranged with the Ogden
Duck Club to furnish the latter with a road along the
top of the reservoir dike. This new road would follow
a different route through the Maw property from that
which was formerly used, but ·would still traverse other
portions of the same property which the Maws owned
both in 1936 and up to the time of the purchase from
then1 by the United States for the Willard. Bay Reservoir (R. 72 - p. 52).
When the Weber Basin District and the United
States was ready to purchase the lands for the Willard
Bay project, several members of each organization contacted Mr. Orlo Maw, one of the plaintiffs, who was
also at the time the president of W. John Maw and
Sons, Inc., for the purchase of the properties needed
for the project (R. 72- p. 47). Orlo Maw informed the
various individuals that his company would not consider selling the lands involved unless his uncle George,
himself. and his cousins were protected as to their shooting privileges in the Ogden Duck Club, either in that
they would be paid for the privileges or that the privileges would not be disturbed in any way.
Pursuant to negotiations then being undertaken,
Orlo ~law received written assurance from the Weber
Basin 'Yater District that by signing an out-of-court

9
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agreement for the purchase of the lands, certain other
interests, including " .. .specifically your duck club
shooting privileges/~ would be excluded from the settlement, and that such property interests which would be
u • • • required in the construction of .the Dam or which
would be damaged or destroyed would be appraised at
a later date and an offer to purchase will be made.~'
(Pl. Ex. A.)
Thereupon on July 15, 1957, Orlo Maw executed
a Land Purchase Contract with the United States of
America for the purchase of the properties, wherein
it was stated among other things that the right-of-way
which gave the Maws claim to the duck club shooting
privileges would not be included in the contract. Its
terms provided as follows:
''3a. It is understood and agreed that the rights
to be conveyed to the United States ... shall
be free from lien or encumbrance except: . . .
and (ii) rights-of-way for roads, (including the
right-of-way granted to the Ogden Duck Club
across Tract 95) , . . . "
(See Pl. Exh. C-LAND PURCHASE CONTRACT)
For nearly a year thereafter the matter rested
quietly until members of the Maw family began to
demand that arrangements be made to protect their
hunting privileges or that they be paid for them. Correspondence was received from J. Stuart McMaster,
field solicitor of the United States Department of Interior at Salt Lake City making mention of the hunting

.!'
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privileges and suggesting a meeting to determine
whether all of the ~law people " ... are interested in
retaining \)ttch hunting privileges." However, nothing
was ever concluded, and the matter dragged until court
ad ion was finally brought. (Pl. Exh. D).

In the n1eantime, and before court action was commenced, the Weber Basin District undertook construction activities, obliterated the old right-of-way which
the Ogden Duck Club had been using, created a new
roadway over other portions of what were the Maw
properties which it had acquired, and the duck club
began using the new route. The Ogden Duck Club
thereupon notified the Maws that their duck club hunting privileges had terminated.
It later developed in the deposition of Mr. Eubank,
secretary of the Ogden Duck Club, that the notice given
to the l\Iaws of the termination of their rights was given
nfter the Ogden Duck Club had executed a Quit Claim
Deed to the l\Iaws to various lands in the area, which
included the right-of-way held out in the Land Purchase Contract with the United States (Pl. Exh. C),
and that the deed had been furnished "so that the Maws
could get their settlement money" (R. 54, 59). Howe,·er, the evidence would have actually established that
the 'y eber Basin District was instrumental in securing
the deed from the Ogden Duck Club, that none of the
~law family ever knew of its existence, execution or
delivery, and that in fact the deed was secured and
received by the 'Veber Basin District people and recorded and returned to themselves (R. 72 - p. 19, 20).

11
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This lawsuit arose when plaintiffs were refused
payment for the value of their duck club shooting privileges.
ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFFS SHOULD HAVE BEEN
PERMITTED· TO PUT ON EVIDENCE TO A
JURY· ESTABLISHING A THIRD-PARTY
BENEFICIARY C 0 NT R ACT LIABILITY
AGAINST THE WEBER BASIN DISTRICT.

During the pre-trial proceedings held immediately
prior to the scheduled trial, Orlo Maw (while sitting in
the audience area behind the courtroom rail) stated:
"MR. lVIAW: They informed me that by preparing this letter to protect all rights which I had no right
to sell, that we would avoid a condemnation suit by
proceeding with the contract, and I refused to sign the
contract until the protection, and all of us concerned
were given protection, and as a result the letter was
prepared before I signed the contract. Otherwise, I
would have let it go in the condemnation" (R. 72-p. 51).
It is submitted that Orlo Maw, through W. John
Maw and Sons, Inc., created a binding and valid thirdparty beneficiary contract in favor of himself, his uncle
George, and his cousins, relating to the duck club shooting privileges, and that the Weber Basin District received the benefit of, and acknowledged the existence
of this agreement by virtue of the following letter pre-
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Pared hr. leo· a l counsel for the Weber
and delivered to l\Ir. Maw before the
was signed by his company and Grace
letter which was delivered to him follows
~

Basin District
land purchase
B. Maw. The
(Pl. Exh. A):

\VEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT
506 Kiesel Building

Ogden Utah
July 5, 1957
Neil R. Olmstead
Legal Counsel
E. J. Fjeldsted
Manager

llarold E. Ellison
President
\Vin Templeton
Chief Engineer
Jimmy Kostoff
Assistant Engineer
\V. John Maw and Sons, Inc.
Plain City
Ptah
Gentlemen:

Tract Nos. 95, 104, and 106
Willard Dam and Reservoir
W. JOHN MAW AND SONS, INC.
It is our understanding that you have executed a
contract for the sale to the United States of tract Nos.
n.>. 104 and 106, Willard Dam and Reservoir.
This letter will assure you that the land purchase
contract does not cover your other property interests in
the \Yillard Bay Area, and specifically your state leases,
water rights, easements, licenses, duck club shooting
privileges, or lands other than those described in the
land purchase contract. Any such property interests

13
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which will be required in the construction of the Dam
or which will be damaged or destroyed will be appraised
at a later date and an offer to purchase will be made.
Yours very truly,
s/d E. J. FJELDSTED
E. J. FJELDSTED
Manager
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
ELMER CARVER, Plain City; WARD C. HOLBROOK, Bountiful; LEROY B. SMITH, Sunset;
HORALD G. CLARK, Morgan; D. D. McKAY,
Huntsville; ED\VARD SORENSON, Oakley;
HAROLD D. ELLISON, Layton; FRANCIS V.
SIMPSON, Hooper; W. R. WHITE, Ogden
The foregoing letter was prepared by E. J. Skeen,
attorney for the District, and was signed by E. J.
Fjeldsted, Manager of the Weber Basin Water District. And, as has been stated, notwithstanding the
reference in the letter that the contract had been executed, the proof would have established that this letter
was received ten days prior to the actual signing of the
Land Purchase Contract, and that it would not have
been signed had the letter not been furnished. (See Pl.
Exh. C).
Although the letter was addressed to W. John
Maw and Sons, Inc., no real question can be raised that
the corporation ever had any "duck club shooting privileges", as therein contained, since it is clear that all
concerned recognized that it had none and that the privi-
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leges ran to George C. Maw and to his various nephews.
Further, and very significantly, if the court will look
at plaintiff's Exhibit A in the record, it will find that
t~:xhibit A consists of three executed originals and two
i'.l'ccntcd copies of the same letter which were handed to
Orlo lVIa w for delivery to the various members of the
~law family having the hunting privileges. Orlo Maw
would have testified that he insisted that such proof
be furnished so that all concerned would have a tangible
record that their rights were recognized.
Subsequently, and after more than a year, Mr.
J. Stuart McMaster, field solicitor for the United States
Department of the Interior, recognized that the various
public agencies were considering these rights in the following letter (Pl. Exh. D) :
UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
410 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
September 11, 1958
~Ir. George C. Maw
Roy, Utah
Dear

~Ir.

Maw:

Thank you for your letter of September 9, 1958
regarding the Ogden Duck Club.
l~ ?U are advised that the matter has not been finally
deterlllined, but we are working on it. Please advise me
15
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if it would be possible for us to meet at a convenient
time with the Maw people who are interested in the
hunting privileges. We are interested in determining
whether or not all of them are interested in retaining
such hunting privileges.
I would appreciate hearing from you at your earliest convenience.
Very truly yours,
s/d J. Stuart McMaster
J. STUART McMASTER
Field Solicitor
Copy to: Reg. Dir., BR, SLCU, attn: 4-400
Projects Manager, BR, Ogden, Utah
The cases in Utah clearl! recognize that one person
can make on behalf of another person a contract which
will inure to his benefit, and that the latter can bring
an action on the contract. This was done here. Further,
Utah law recognizes that a direct beneficiary, whether
he be a creditor beneficiary or a donee beneficiary, can
bring the action.
It is not entirely clear from Orlo Maw's statement
as to whether he felt that W. John Maw and Sons, Inc.,
owed a duty to these plaintiffs to protect them as to their
rights, or whether he was doing so out of other considerations. In any event, whether the contract be
founded upon a creditor or a donee relationship, Utah
clearly recognizes this type of agreement:

Kelly v. Richards_, 95 Utah 560, 83 P. (2d) 731,
129 ALR 164:
16
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"The rule of allowing the third party beneficiary to recover is recognized now in America
beeause it is reasonable and is not merely acceptable as a flat rule of law. It is just and expedient
to allow the person for whose benefit the contract
is made to enforce it against the person whose
duty it is to pay. However, an incidental beneficiary has no rights under the contract. Robins
Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 US 303,
48 S Ct 134, 72 L ed 290 and German Alliance
Ins. Co. v. Homewater Supply Co., 226 US
2:!0, 33 S Ct 32, 57 L ed 195, 42 LRA (NS)
1000, are to the effect that before a third party
can sue for a breach of a contract to which he
was not a party he must show that the contract
was intended to benefit him directly. The terms
of the agreement and the facts and circumstances
that surround its making can be examined to
determine whether the supposed beneficiary was
in fact intended to be such .
"
Further''A stranger may benefit by a contract if promises are made where the promisee has no pecuniary interest in the performance of the contract, his object being to enter into it for the
benefit of such stranger, or ~~ere the promisee
seeks indirectly to discharge an obligation of his
own to the stranger by securing from the promisor a promise to pay such person. Vol. 12, American Juris prudence, Contracts, Section 283."
The matter is further set forth in a series of cases
from l-...tah. the rule being summarized completely in
Broh·n v. Markland~ 16 U. 360, 52 P. 597, where the
court stated:

17
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"She thereafter had a right to look to him for
payment of her claim, under the rule that "where
a promise or contract has been made between two
parties for the benefit of a third, an action will
·lie thereon at the instance and in the name of the
party to be benefited, although the promise or
contract was made without his knowledge, and
without any consideration moving from him."
Montgomery v. Spencer, 15 Utah, 495, 50 Pac.
624; Thompson v. Cheesman, 15 Utah, 43, 48
Pac. 477; Clark v. Risk, 9 Utah, 94, 33 Pac.
248; I Pars. Cont. p. 465."
At this· point plaintiffs anticipate that defendants
will attempt to attack the original 1936 Agreement
between Annie C. Maw and the Ogden Duck Club
on one or more theories. However, it should be pointed
out that, even if some doubt could have existed as to
whether or not the Maws of the second generation (i.e.
grandsons) were entitled to the duck club shooting
privileges, that doubt was resolved and a new contractual arrangement was entered into by the Weber Basin
District in the form of a third-party beneficiary arrangement. This is so because W. John Maw and Sons
gave up its right to litigate the matter of compensation
in a court of law in exchange for the recognition and
protection of the duck shooting privileges in the Ogden
Duck Clulh
Nowhere in the correspondence of Mr. Fjeldsted
or Mr. McMaster does it remotely appear that there
was any question as to the validity of these rights;
rather, both letters affirmatively recognize the exist-
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em·e of the duck club shooting privileges. No referemT was made of any privileges which "might exist,"
nor were the words "if any," or other similar lan•ru:wc.
used. Bear in mind that both letters were written
/"'
/"'
by lawyers. The privileges were recognized in a positive manner and the agreement to appraise and pay
for then1 if damaged or taken was clear-cut.
In 12 Am. J ur., Contracts, Par. 87 at p. 581, the
general rule is stated:
"The view is taken by some authorities that
although forbearance from suit on a clearly invalid claim is insufficient consideration for a
promise, forbearance from suit on a claim of
doubtful validity is sufficient consideration for
a promise if there is a sincere belief in the validity
of the claim. The view is taken that a reasonable
and sincere belief in the validity of the claim is
necessary and sufficient. It is sometimes stated
that if an intending litigant bona fide forbears
a right to litigate, he gives up something of value.
The reality of the claim which is given up must
be measured, not by the state of the law as it is
ultimately discovered to be, but by the state of
the knowledge of the person who at the time has
to judge and make the concession. There must,
according to this view, be a real cause of action
-that is, one that is bona fide and not frivilous
or vexatious-but it is not necessary that it be
a cause of action which commends itself to the
ultimate reasoning of the tribunal which has to
consider and determine the case."
Although plaintiffs certainly do not concede that
the Agreement executed in 1936 by Annie C. Maw

19
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would not extend to and benefit her grandsons as well
as her sons, Mr. Williston on Contracts, Vol. II, Sec"
tion 399 at p. 1149 clearly shows that by a third"party
beneficiary contract rights can be created in third par"
ties greater. than might have actually existed between
the promisee and the promisor in the first instance:
"As summarized in the Restatement of Con"
tracts: 'Unless the case is within the rules mak"
ing contracts voidable for mutual mistake, where
performance of a promise in a contract will bene"
fit a person other than the promisee, the promi"
sor's duty is not avoided or limited by an erroneous belief of the promisor or of the promisee
as to the existence or the extent of a duty of the
promisee to the beneficiary.' Where the promise
is to pay a specific debt, for example to assume
a specific mortgage, especially if the amount of
it is deducted from the consideration paid by the
promisor for the mortgaged property, this interpretation will generally be the true one. Most
of the cases accordingly refuse to allow one who
has assumed a specific debt to set up usury or
other defense, of which the debtor might have
availed himself. It should be noticed that this
section presents another instance where the rights
of the beneficiary and of the promisee against
the promisor may not be identical."
II. THE WEBER BASIN WATER DISTRICT IS EVEN NOW ILLEGALLY TRESpASSING ON PLAINTIFFS' LANDS AND
RIGHTS.
When the Motion to Dismiss was argued before
Judge Cowley, plaintiffs contended that they were
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entitled to their duck club shooting privileges because the original right-of-way had been retained and
excepted from the Land Purchase Contract, as has
been previously set forth. Unfortunately, a transcript
of the entire argument at that time was not available .
.J udgc Cowley denied the motion to dismiss following
the same basic argument which is advanced in this brief.
Later, when the deposition of Carlyle Eubank, secretary of the Ogden Duck Club was taken, Mr. Eubank
stated that the duck club had terminated the rights of
the Maws to the shooting privileges because it had
issued a quit claim deed (R. 51) to the Maws which
t·overed the same lands previously deeded by the Maws.
(Compare Pl. Exh. C-Land Purchase Contract, and
Pl. Exh. B-Quitclaim Deed.) This included the area
where the right-of-way was located. His statement was
as follows (R. 54) :

s t iII

"A. No, we don't feel we have had anything
involved in it, and we felt that by the issuance
of this quitclaim deed to the Maws which covered
all of that country out there, that it certainly
abrogated anything that we would have in connection with the land which we couldn't use anyway because it had been closed off by the Government. We couldn't get across it. We couldn't
get through there. We couldn't go across the
ditch. 'Ve had to go around on the Government
road. 'Ve did feel, and do feel to this date, by
the execution of this quitclaim deed which was
executed by the Club which made it possible
for the Maws to obtain their settlement from
the United States Government on all their prop-
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erty that they had out there, that it abrogated
anything that we had."
Mr. Eubank again referred to the same quitclaim
deed on questioning in his deposition ( R. 59) , thus
arousing the suspicions of this writer and plaintiffs who
had never before heard of such a document. Upon later
investigation it was found that the Weber Basin District had gone to the Ogden Duck Club to get the quit
claim deed involved. Suspicions were further aroused
because Mr. Eubank stated that the Ogden Duck Club
held no real estate in the area other than through State
leases which were not involved in the description later
found upon the particular quitclaim deed. Mr. Eubank
stated in his deposition that all of the lands used by
the Ogden Duck Club were leased grounds ( R. 46, 48),
and that they did not own a single acre.
It suddenly became clear that the Weber Basin
District secured this deed in order to eliminate the
right-of-way which was excepted in the original purchase contract which was executed by Grace B. Maw
and W. John Maw and Sons, Inc.
A copy of the quitclaim deed was secured from
the Weber County Recorder's office by this writer, who
found that it did in fact cover the area over which Annie
Maw had granted the Ogden Duck Club a right-ofway in the 1936 Agreement. Further examination of
the deed revealed that it did in fact run to W. John
Maw and Sons, Inc., and Grace B. Maw, who had
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previously given a warranty deed to the very same
properties.
Theorizing that this quitclaim deed from the Ogden
Duck Club to the same persons who executed the
original warranty deed to the lands involved would
eliminate the right-of-way set forth in the land purchase
contract, under the doctrine of after-acquired title, and
thereby perfect an unencumbered title in all of the
reservoir area in the United States, a further look was
had at the deed. Upon examining it more closely (Pl.
gxh. B) it revealed that it was recorded for William
II. \Vilcox, who was at the time an employee of the
\ Veber Basin District.
On checking with the Maws it was found that not
one of them or the corporation had any knowledge or
information that such a deed had ever been executed
or that it had been delivered to anyone, let alone a
member of their group. Further, the original of the
deed was nowhere to be found and it can only be assumed that it is in some government office or in the
possession of the Weber Basin Water District. At any
rnte. the evidence would conclusively establish that none
of the plaintiffs or any of the other Maws ever knew
of the deed, that it was never received by them either
before or after recording, and that it was undoubtedly
secured by underhanded efforts of the Weber Basin
District to perfect a land title in an attempt to avoid
settling with the l\Ia,vs either as to the contract which
wns made for the benefit of these plaintiffs or for the
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actual right-of-way in which they had a vital interest.
It is submitted by plaintiffs that the Weber Basin
District illegally and without authorization of any kind
secured and recorded the quitclaim deed itself because
it full well knew that had the deed been delivered to
the Maws it would not have been released, nor would
another quitclaim deed have been given by them, unless
full settlement had been made according to the existing
understanding.
In view of the unauthorized and unlawful action of
the Weber Basin District in recording and retaining
the quitclaim deed executed by the Ogden Duck Club,
it is submitted that theDistrict is in fact a constructive
trustee of the right-of-way property for the Maws, and
that, since the right-of-way has been obliterated and
the land made useless, the Weber Basin District should
respond in damages both for the value of the shooting
privileges which were tied to the right-of-way and also
punitive damages. It is further submitted that the action
of the Weber Basin District in this respect, if established by the evidence as here claimed, is so unwarranted,
illegal and unauthorized, that it is unnecessary to quote
any law on the subject.
And as for the information apparently received by
Mr. Eubank to the effect that the quit claim deed had
to be secured so that the Maws could get their payment
for the lands involved (R. 54), someone apparently
seriously misinformed Mr. Eubank because the quit
claim deed issued by the Ogden Duck Club was dated
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. \ pril 7. 1958, almost a year after the land purchase
contraet of July 15, 1957, and payment thereunder,
and because the Ogden Duck Club had no interest in
the subject property other than the right-of-way which
was specifically excluded from the Land Purchase Contrud. It was executed at about the same time the pressure was being brought by the Maws to have their rights
recognized or to be paid for them.
Now, so that this court can secure the full import
of a sharp issue of fact crucial to this case, reference
is made to pages 39 and 40 of the record. There is contained an Amended Answer of the Weber Basin District which was filed in court on February 14, 1963the date set for trial and the day the Motion to Dismiss
was granted. The interesting thing about the Amended
Answer is that it affirmatively recognizes the existence
of the elusive quitclaim deed ( Exh. B) which only
came to light in Mr. Eubank's deposition three weeks
earlier, and asserted (I) that the deed was delivered
to 'V. John Maw and Sons, Inc., and Grace B. Maw,
and accepted by them~· and (2) that the acceptance terminated the 1936 Right-of-Way Agreement!
It appears that someone moved too fast in setting
up this defense, or that there were too many helpers for
the defense, because the Amended Answer clearly recognbes that if the quitclaim deed was not delivered to
and accepted b!J the Maws~ then the 1936 right-of-way
agreement was not terminated!
)lr. Eubank in his deposition admitted that the
25
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quitclaim deed was brought to him by the Weber Basin
District and Mr. Skeen, attorney for the District,
volunteered at the time that the deed had been prepared
by the Bureau of Reclamation (R. 55). Eubank further
stated that there were no negotiations or discussions
concerning the deed between the Maws and the Ogden
Duck Club, and that the issuance of the quitclaim deed
was the basis for the termination of the privileges of
the Maws in the Club! (R. 59, 60).
III. THE FACTS RAISE AN ESTOPPEL
AGAINST THE WEBER BASIN DISTRICT.
Without belaboring each and every issue upon
which plaintiffs should be entitled to recover against
the Weber Basin Water District, it is submitted that
the facts which have been established to this point,
albeit they are incomplete because the proof was never
brought to actual trial, establish that the Weber Basin
Water District should not now be permitted to employ
side agreements or other conduct which would secure
a land purchase settlement in one instance upon a representation and a promise made by it, and thereafter
renege from its first position. In the case of Weber
Basin Conservancy District v. Hislop .. 362 P. 2d 580,
12 Utah 2d 64, the "'\Veber Basin District was instrumental in negotiating an agreement with the State Road
Commission whereby the main highway by-passed
around the community of Huntsville because the reservoir created by the District inundated the former road
serving the community. The almost complete loss of
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trall'ic and serious resulting property and business dam-

age to the Hislop properties was permitted to go unpaid
bt·rause this court held that no one had a compensable
interest resulting from the flow of traffic passing one's
business property and that, apparently, this result
would have not been different as to the Hislops or other
rtsidents of Huntsville even had the District made no
provision for a re-located road, and the town left isolated. Perhaps the Weber Basin Water District is
hoping here to by-pass its commitments in the same
way, but this is a much different case.
The previously quoted case of Kelly v. Richards~
recognizes that an action can lie in estoppel on the facts
presented here:
" 'This estoppel arises when one of his acts,
representation or admissions, or by his silence
when he ought to speak out, intentionally or
through culpable negligence induces another to
believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will
be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny
the existence of such facts. It consists in holding
for the truth a representation acted upon, when
the person who made it, or his privies, seek to
deny its truth, and to deprive the party who has
acted upon it of the benefit obtained.' 21 Corpus
Juris, pp. 1113, 1114, 1115.
"Essential Elements-a. In General.
'In order to constitute this kind of estoppel
there must exist a false representation or concealment of material facts; it must have been
made with knowledge, actual or constructive,
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of the facts; the party to whom it was made must
have been without knowledge or the means of
knowledge of the real facts; it must have been
made with the intention that it should be acted
upon; and the party to whom it was made must
have relied on or acted upon it to his prejudice.
To constitute an 'estoppel in pais' there must
concur an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterward asserted, action
by the other party thereon and injury to such
other party. There can be no estoppel if either of
these elements are wanting. They are each of
equal importance.' 21 Corpus Juris, pp. 1119,
1120. See, also, Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence
(4th Ed.) p. 1644; Bigelow on Estoppel (6th
Ed.) pp. 603, 604.
"It is essential therefore that the representation, whether it arises by words, acts or conduct,
must have been of a material fact; that it must
have been willfully intended to lead the party
setting up the estoppel to act upon it or that
there must have been reasonable grounds and
cause to think that because thereof he would
change his position or do some act or take some
course on faith in the conduct, and that such action results to his detriment if the person sought
to be estopped may now repudiate the words or
interpretation placed upon such conduct. This
does not require an actual intent to defraud but
only that the circumstances and conduct were
such as would perpetrate a fraud or unfair advantage if the party could now deny what he had
induced or suffered another to believe and act
upon. It is an essential element of estoppel in
pais that the person involving it relied upon the
representation or conduct of the other party,
was influenced in his own conduct by it, and
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would not have acted as he did but for the acts
of which he complains ... We do not mean that
these are all the elements, nor that in every case
all tnust co-exist equally but some of these elements must be present in every estoppel."
As previously stated, it is submitted that the interpretation of the 1936 agreement between the Ogden
Duck Club and Annie C. Maw would have no bearing
upon the liability of the Weber Basin Water District.
liowcYer, that particular issue could be of some concern as to defendant Ogden Duck Club were it not for
.Mr. Eubank's admission that the quitclaim deed terminated the hunting privileges. It was upon the court's
interpretation of this agreement that both the Ogden
Duck Club and the Weber Basin District were summarily dismissed from the lawsuit without considering
other matters. But plaintiffs have no intention of letting
this appeal become side-tracked into an argument relating to the extent of the 1936 Right-of-Way agreement
as to the 'Veber Basin Water District.

The issue of interpreting the 1936 Right-of-Way
Agreement primarily involves a question of whether
its benefits extended to the grandsons of Annie C. Maw,
who represent all but one of these plaintiffs. On this
issue, these points are set forth:
( 1) No suggestion was raised by Mr. Fjeldsted in his letter (Exh. A), or in the statements
or conduct of other persons negotiating for the
land purchase with Orlo Maw, which indicated
that only George C. Maw (the one surviving
son) had such rights. Otherwise, why would five
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executed letters have been delivered to Orlo Maw
for further delivery among the family?
(2) Mr. McMaster in his letter clearly acknowledges the existence of the duck hunting
privileges (Exh. D), and recognizes that the
rights extended to several person~
(3) Mr. Neilson, one of the three attorneys
for the Weber Basin District, stated (R. 73p. 12):

" . . . the right-of-way agreement as drawn
is in a rather confusing manner."
( 4) Mr. Eubank in his deposition (R. 72 p. 53, 54, 60) recognizes the existence of the
rights of the Maws up to the time he gave the
quit claim deed to the Weber Basin District and
began using the new road.

( 5) All of the plaintiffs would have testified,
and Mr. Eubank admitted ( R. 72 - p. 40), that
they used the duck shooting}acilities after their
fathers died with full concurrence of the duck
club.
( 6) Any question regarding the interpretation of the 1936 Right-of-Way Agreement
should be made against the Ogden Duck Club
for the reason that it was prepared by its own
attorneys and not by an attorney for Mrs. Maw
(R. 45).
(7) Defendant's attorneys were uncertain
whether the 1936 Agreement was a contract or
a covenant running with the land. (R. 72- p. 19) ·
( 8) The court variously commented on the

1936 Agreement: "I have struggled wit~ ~t a
bit ... " (R. 72 - p. 18); and "I say 1t IS a
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vaeuum, it is a completed instrument, take it
out of a vacuum and put it in life, it might not
be, that is what I am wondering." (R. 72- p. 41).

An analysis of the 1936 Agreement shows that it
specifically included four sons of Annie C. Maw \Vilmer .T. l\Iaw, Rufus Maw, Gilbert Maw and George
Maw. As to these sons it granted anon-assessable shootin[! privileges ... n and further statedJ

a

•••

provided that in any year the said Wilmer

J. 1llaw, Rufus MawJ Gilbert Maw., and George Maw
dcsiynate one son for each thereof to shoot and enjoy
the privileges hereunder in place of such son"'s father.;

Based upon the foregoing, upon the death of the
fathers the respective sons used the privileges of the
Ogden Duck Club without objection, on the basis that
their parents had made a permanent designation entitling them to use the hunting facilities. Although
defendants may contend that a designation could only
be made on a year-to-year basis, and that the death of
any son terminated any rights in their sons, the actions
of the parties involved over the years do not bear out
this interpretation of the agreement.
Further, the agreement ran to the grantor " ...
and the members of her family hereinafter mentioned
so long as grantees and any successors shall maintain
said clubhouse and shooting grounds for the purpose
of shooting tcild fowl. It is interesting to note that
had the intention been to limit the contract rights to
0
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Mrs. Maw and her sons it would have been an easy
matter to say that it ran to her and her sons; rather,
it did not refer to any designated individuals, but
referred to the generic and all-inclusive group of "members of her family hereinafter mentioned," and specific
mention was made of her sons' sons, as previously set
forth.
Black~s Law Dictionary., 1'hird Edition~ defines

a family as including " ... a group of blood relatives;
all the relations who spring from a common ancestor,
or who spring from a common root."
Another issue which was raised at the pre-trial
hearing both before Judge Cowley, who denied the
motion to dismiss, and before Judge Wahlquist, was
that the Ogden Duck Club was not obligated to any
of the Maws, even as to George C. Maw, a surviving
son, because the Maws no longer had an obligation to
maintain a portion of the roadway as the 1936 Agreement requires. But the proof would have been that the
Maws were ready, able and willing to maintain the
necessary passage of roadway involved, that they had
done so in the past, that they were doing so as far as
was necessary at the present time, and that they would
do so in the future because the portion of roadway which
they were required to maintain was never acquired by
the Weber Basin District and still lies dormant and
unused.
This writer has no intention of picking the 1936
Agreement apart piece by piece, because it is felt that
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the eou1·t ean rend the short agreement and determine
for itself whether any ambiguity exists in it and whether
it en·n has any bearing on this case-which plaintiffs'
sineerely controvert. In any event, it is submitted that
the Ogden Duck Club has shown no excuse for relieving
itself of an obligation to George C. Maw, one of the
surviving sons of Annie C. Maw, nor should the Weber
Basin \Yater Distric~ be permitted to go through the
back door in an effort to extricate itself from liability
in this lawsuit.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law supporting the Judgment in this matter were prepared in the
netion upon the request of the court that a "memorandum opinion" be prepared for the files, but since they
represent nothing more than an attempt to relieve the
defendants from liability upon the basis of defendants'
own interpretation of what they would like the facts
to establish in their behalf, and upon the back-door
approach to the matter seeking to undermine the 1936
Agreement, plaintiffs submit that they have missed the
issues of this case entirely. Further, Finding of Fact
No. H. which states that the Ogden Duck Club delivered the quitclaim deed involved to the Maws, is
absolutely erroneous and unsupported, and is contradicted by the record available at this time.
IY. THE OGDEN DUCK CLUB SHOULD
RESPOND IN DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS
FOR BRE ...-\CH OF CONTRACT.
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The Ogden Duck Club still uses property formerly
owned by the Maws in going to and from its clubhouse
facilities and shooting grounds. The clubhouse which
it maintains is the very same clubhouse which it formerly had, even though it was physically removed about
%of a mile west of where it was formerly located. And
substantially the same shooting grounds are still used
by it, less a portion which was taken for the Willard
Bay Reservoir site. Although the road which it now uses
through the property formerly owned by the Maws
runs along the top of the dike constructed by the Weber
Basin District for a greater part of its distance, it
should be noted that the original agreement between the
Ogden Duck Club and Annie C. Maw did not pinpoint
the exact location of the right-of-way. It was in the
nature of a floating right-of-way following the best
available route through a large area, and the evidence
would have established that it was altered somewhat
from time to time to accommodate water conditions and
other factors.
The Ogden Duck Club, in believing the represen·
tations of the Weber Basin District that it was necessary
to quitclaim the roadway area to the Maws, may have
concluded that it had thereby performed its 1936 contract obligations. It obviously felt obligated up to that
time. But the fact remains that the quitclaim deed was
never delivered to any of the Maws or to anyone acting
in their behalf! Under the circumstances, it is submitted
that the Ogden Duck Club should respond in damages
to plaintiffs, and that it might thereafter or simulta-
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rwouslv set forth a separate cause of action against the

\\'ebe; Basin \Vater District for inducing it to take
the action it did in reliance upon statements made to
it that the deed was necessary in order to make it possible for the Maws to settle with the government. At
anv r·ate, in view of these unsavory facts it is not surprising that the Weber Basin Water District undertook
to furnish legal counsel for the Ogden Duck Club
instead of having the Ogden Duck Club secure its own
counsel (R. 52). Perhaps, with the knowledge now
antilablc, the Ogden Duck Club would employ separate
counsel should the matter be returned for trial.
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
as follows:
" . . . Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law are unnecessary on decisions of motions
under Rule 12 or 56, or any other ~otion except
as provided in Rule 41 (b).''

In view of the foregoing rule why were Findings
of }.,act and Conclusions of Law prepared in this
matter? A motion to dismiss is based upon a failure
of the complaint to state a claim entit!ing the pleader
to relief. Quite obviously, the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law were prepared because the court,
in effect, instead of permitting the matter to,go to the
jury. treated the action as a dismissal under Rule 41
(b), as though the plaintiffs had completed the presentation of their evidence. But such evidence should have
been entitled to go before the jury, and the court should
not have stepped into the matter as it did.
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The dilemma which the plaintiffs faced at pre-trial
was that of not only setting forth their theories, as they
had previously done in concise and definite form upon
the court's request (R. 30-32), but in being forced to
reveal every bit of vital and damaging evidence for
the scrutiny of the opposition in an effort to avoid being
thrown out of court. A pre-trial hearing which requires
the moving party to secure from the pockets of each
of the plaintiffs their own executed copies of letters
furnished them by Mr. Fjeldsted so that a desperate
effort could be made to at least preserve one's record
for an appeal, and to come forth all other items of
documentary evidence and push them upon the Clerk's
desk by way of a proffer of proof at the time the court
was ruling they could proceed no further, does not
appear to serve the purpose of a pre-trial proceeding
or a motion to dismiss.

SUMMARY
It is submitted that the facts established from what
plaintiffs were able to get into the record, together with
those indicated facts which plaintiffs have contended
would be proved, show a course of conduct on the part
of the Weber Basin Water District of such unauthorized unlawful and outrageous nature that only a minimum amount of legal authority should be advanced to
support the position of the plaintiffs. It is hoped that
this court approaches the case in its chronological sequence, and that it does not permit itself to fall into
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the trap of having both defendants use the back-door
approad1 of attaeking the 1936 Right-of-Way Agreemt·nt in order to extricate themselves. It is submitted
that sueh approach, even if tried, cannot sustain their
defensive position in any respect, but that if it were
in faet available to the Ogden Duck Club it would only
arail the Ogden Duck Club as to the plaintiffs other
than George C. Maw, who still survives as a son of
Annie C. Maw.
The gist of this litigation is predicated upon other
doings and dealings of the Weber Basin Water District
whieh have been clearly outlined and set forth in this
brief.
Plaintiffs recognize that a trial judge is burdened
with many cases and that the law and the problems
whieh come before him are often very complex and confusing. But, plaintiffs subJ?it that this very condition
is the one which should cause a trial judge to avoid
making decisions based on statements and claims of
eounsel immediately before commencing a trial, thereby
becoming side-tracked into a completely erroneous
analysis of a case which he has to try.
Judge Cowley heard lengthy arguments on the
matter before it ever reached the pre-trial stage, and
he took the matter under careful advisement. It was his
ruling, exactly contrary to that of Judge Wahlquist,
that a motion to dismiss should be denied (R. 21).
Xothing substantially different was argued before
.T udge 'Yahlquist, at least to the point where it became
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clear that he simply was not going to let the plaintiffs
go to trial. Actually, Judge Wahlquist had extra material in the form of the exhibits, the deposition of Mr.
Eubank and plaintiffs' Statement of Legal Theories
(R. 30).
Plaintiffs submit that Judge Cowley was correct
in his ruling and that Judge Wahlquist was incorrect
in dismissing the action.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the court reverse
the ruling of the lower court and that the matter be sent
back for a trial before a jury to determine the matter
of damages sustained by plaintiffs and such other issues
as might be found to exist in this action.
Glen E. Fuller
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants
15 East 4th South Street

Salt Lake City, Utah
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APPENDIX

(i)
RIGHT-OF-WAY AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made between ANNIE
C. l\IAW of Plain City, Weber County, Utah, Grantor,
and OGDEN DUCK CLUB, a Utah corporation, and
its me1nbers, Grantees.

\V I T N E S S E T H
'Yhereas, Grantor is owner of lands In Sections
20-17-18, Township 7 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake
~leridian, as now appears of record in the offices of
the County Recorders of "\Veber and Box Elder Counties, State of Utah; and
\Vhereas, Grantees and their predecessors in
interest are now, and have been, using said lands for
many years for right-of-way purposes;
Now therefore, in consideration of $1.00 in hand
paid and other valuable consideration, receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged and the matters herein recited,
Grantor does hereby give and grant unto Grantees and
1
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their successors in interest a convenient right-of-way
over and across said lands for the purpose of going to
and from the Club House owned by Grantees in Section 12, Township 7 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake
Meridian, and the shooting grounds of Grantee lying
North of the above described lands and other lands
now owned by Grantor, and to construct and maintain
a ditch, or ditches, at expense of Grantees, in said Section 18, Township 7 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake
Meridian, for the purpose of conducting water thereon,
over, and to said Club House and grounds of said
Grantees. This grant shall be exclusive to Grantees as
to the purposes herein expressed except as to Grantor
and the members of her family hereinafter mentioned
so long as Grantees and any successors shall maintain
said Club House and shooting grounds for the purpose
of shooting wild fowl.
In consideration of non-assessable shooting privi·
leges on said shooting grounds of Grantees on days
excepting the opening day, Saturdays, Sundays, and
holidays, to be enjoyed by, and hereby granted to,
the sons of Grantor named as follows, to-wit:
Wilmer J. Maw, Rufus J. Maw, Gilbert Maw, and
George Maw, Grantor agrees to maintain in a travelable condition the road which is a part of the right-ofway herein granted to Grantees, now existing in said
Section 20, Township 7 North, Range 2 West, Salt
Lake Meridian along the North rod of the East half
of said section; provided that in any year the said
11
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\Vilmer J. ~law, Rufus Maw, Gilbert Maw, and George
~law may designate one son for each thereof to shoot
and enjoy the privileges hereunder in place of such
son's father; but it is expressly understood that blinds
on the shooting grounds of Grantees being used at any
time by said sons shall be given up to members of the
Ogden Duck Club upon request.

In consideration of the feed and grazing benefits
to be enjoyed and hereby granted by the Ogden Duck
Club to Grantor or her successors on lands controlled
by said Ogden Duck Club and its successors in the
vieinity of lands owned by Grantor, Grantor agrees to
back up all surplus water of the two creeks running
through lands of the Grantor above the present dam
located on the North side of the Northeast quarter of
said Section 20, and to turn water loose through said
dam at the pleasure of Grantees.
This agreement shall be binding upon the heirs
and assigns of the Grantor and the successors and
assigns of the Grantees.
Annie C. Maw
Grantor
OGDEN DUCK CLUB, a Corporation
Grantee
By: A. W. Hestmark
President
By: W. H. Reeder Jr.
Secretary
l1l
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WEBER
On the 29th day of December, 1936, personally
appeared before me Annie C. Maw, the signer of the
foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me
that she executed the same.
Lewis J. Wallace
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Ogden, Utah
(SEAL)
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